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ABSTRACT 
 This research examined the effect of U.S. Navy Special Warfare Sea, Air, and 
Land (SEAL) combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan on casualties and 
combat-specific compensation. Data was collected from restricted SEAL personnel 
records obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center  and Social Security 
Administration to identify and profile all U.S. active duty enlisted Navy Special Warfare 
operators having served in Iraq or Afghanistan from 2007–2012. During those years, 
SEAL operators sustained a fatality rate in Iraq and Afghanistan that was nearly 9 times 
greater than that of the overall U.S. military. Additionally, the SEAL operators who 
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan from 2007–2012 had a total likelihood of death of 800 
per 100,000—250 times that of the national workplace average in 2012. Furthermore, 
deployed SEAL operators to Iraq or Afghanistan from 2007–2012 experienced an 
increased chance of death of 530 per 100,000 compared to the SEAL operators remaining 
stateside. This level of additional risk is 11 times greater than the additional risk all U.S. 
military service members sustained while deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan from 
2001–2012. Finally, this thesis uses the incremental risk incurred by SEAL operators 
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan to estimate an appropriate ex ante compensation level of 
$14,442 per month in comparison to the current level of combat pay equal to $225 per 
month for Imminent Danger Pay/Hostile Fire Pay. 
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U.S. Navy Special Warfare Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) operators are tasked with 
the most dangerous missions to defend the United States against foreign enemies. Since 
1962, Navy SEALs have fought in every major conflict, providing crucial special warfare 
capabilities in maritime and land domains. Although not uncharacteristic of other U.S. 
Special Operations Forces (USSOF), Navy SEALs incur tremendous amounts of risk in 
the execution of these critical, but dangerous operations. This can be easily observed from 
the fatality rates of the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of the combined total of 6,902 
U.S. military deaths as of October 2020 (Department of Defense [DOD], 2020b), 57 were 
Navy SEALs (Defense Manpower Data Center [DMDC], n.d.). For a force size of 
approximately 2,500 (Mann & Burton, 2019), the fatality to force size ratio is 4.5 times 
higher than across the entire DOD with 1.38 million active duty service members in 2020.1 
High fatality rates are to be expected from Special Operations Forces (SOF) due to the 
greater probability of engaging in combat and other high-risk activities compared to 
conventional forces. For example, just over half of all SEAL fatalities since 2001 occurred 
while flying inside a helicopter, a critical but vulnerable insertion method often used by 
SOF.2 This research examines U.S. Navy SEAL combat deployments to Iraq and 
Afghanistan and their effect on casualties for the purpose of proposing an effective and 
equitable ex ante compensation for deployment-based fatality risk of Navy Special 
Operations Forces (NAVSOF) and other USSOF units. 
This examination is a continuation of the research completed by Armey et al. in the 
2018 working paper Combat, Casualties, and Compensation: Evidence from Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Where Armey et al. analyzed the effect of deployment on casualties for all 
military personnel deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, this research specifically focuses on 
Navy SEAL deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Data were collected from restricted 
enlisted SEAL personnel records from the Defense Manpower Data Center and Social 
                                                 
1 DOD active duty military force size found from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), 2020.  
2 Open source research revealed approximately 51% of all SEAL combat fatalities from 2001 to 
present were helicopter related. 
2 
Security Administration (SSA) for the years 2007 to 2012. The data show Navy SEAL 
casualty figures for Iraq and Afghanistan distributed across race, education, age, and 
marital status. In a methodology consistent with that of Armey et al. (2018), the effect of 
combat deployments on casualties for Navy SEALs was calculated using stateside SEAL 
operators as the control group and deployed SEAL operators in Iraq or Afghanistan as the 
treatment group. Lastly, this thesis proposes an appropriate risk-based combat pay for 
deployed NAVSOF and other USSOF personnel. 
This thesis further extends the large body of literature that has researched the effects 
of combat deployments on a number of consequential outcomes. Many such studies 
focused on the effects of a combat deployment on mental and physical health issues (Cesur 
et al., 2013, 2015; Cunha et al., 2016). Other studies focused on the relationship between 
combat deployments and negative familial matters such as domestic violence, substance 
use, homelessness, and divorces (Cesur & Sabia, 2016; Cesur et al., 2016; Ackerman et al., 
2020; Negrusa et al., 2014). Lastly, further studies explored the effects of combat 
deployments on educational outcomes (Armey & Lipow, 2016; Engel et al., 2010). As in 
previous studies, this thesis utilizes combat deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan as the 
independent variable. 
The results show that from 2007–2012, Navy Special Warfare (SEAL) operators 
sustained an overall fatality rate of 0.31% with 0.07% being attributed to stateside deaths. 
This incidence of stateside deaths is 20% greater than that of the entire active duty military 
force from 2001–20123 and is likely the result of high-risk training activities. Additionally, 
from 2007–2012, SEAL operators sustained a fatality rate in Iraq and Afghanistan of 
0.24%—nearly nine times greater than that of the entire active duty military force from 
2001–2012.4 Moreover, the data reveal that SEAL operators who deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan in a single year were subject to a total likelihood of death of 800 per 100,000 
                                                 
3 The fatality rate for U.S. military service members stateside from 2001–2012 was found to be 
0.0582% (Armey et al., 2018). 
4 The fatality rate for all active duty military from 2001–2012 was calculated at 0.027% (Armey et al., 
2018). 
3 
which is 250 times greater than the national work place average.5 Furthermore, the data 
show that the SEAL operators who deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan in a single year had an 
increased chance of death of 530 per 100,000 compared to non-deployed SEAL operators 
stateside—over 11 times greater than the increased likelihood of death experienced by all 
U.S. military personnel deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan.6 To compensate for that level of 
additional risk, this analysis uses a $10.9 million Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) to 
suggest a compensation amount of $14,442/month compared to the current $225/month in 
combat pay provided to U.S. military personnel deployed within combat zones.  
  
                                                 
5 The national civilian workplace average in 2012 was 3.2 per 100,000 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) 
workers (U.S. Department of Labor, 2012). 
6 U.S. military service members deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan from 2001–2012 sustained an 
increase of 48 per 100,000 in the likelihood of death as a result of the deployment (Armey et al., 2018). 
4 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. HISTORY OF THE SEAL TEAMS 
In every major conflict beginning with World War II, the U.S. Navy Sea, Air, and 
Land (SEAL) Teams and their predecessors have sustained incredible amounts of 
personnel risk while completing strategically important operations. Although exceedingly 
dangerous, these special operations were critical to U.S. war efforts by providing strategic 
effects at the tactical and operational levels. 
Though the first two SEAL Teams were not commissioned until 1962, their 
predecessors—the Scouts and Raiders, Navy Combat Demolition Units (NCDUs), and 
Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs)—began operating at the beginning of the U.S. 
involvement in World War II. First to be established, the Scouts and Raiders, formed in 
1942 from a joint group of sailors, marines, and soldiers, were responsible for locating and 
reconnoitering enemy-held beaches. Then, once a landing assault was underway, the 
Scouts and Raiders would maintain reconnaissance positions on the beach and guide the 
amphibious assault to the correct landing beach (Dockery, 2004). This mission was 
executed numerous times to support Allied landings on the coastline of North Africa, Italy, 
and southern France. In the Pacific theater, the Scouts and Raiders, also known as the 
Special Service Units, participated in over 40 amphibious operations while broadening 
their mission to include guerilla warfare with the Chinese (Naval Special Warfare 
Command [NSWC], n.d.). 
In 1943, the Navy Combat Demolition Units were formed in preparation for 
Operation OVERLORD, the allied invasion of Normandy. Similar to the Scouts and 
Raiders, the NCDUs were trained to reconnoiter enemy-held beaches. However, unlike the 
Scouts and Raiders, the NCDUs would also locate and destroy any underwater obstacles 
in preparation for an amphibious assault. During Operation OVERLORD, commonly 
referred to as “D-Day,” a total of 34 NCDU teams succeeded in creating several openings 
within the German defenses on Omaha Beach and Utah Beach (NSWC, n.d.). Despite being 
under constant fire, the NCDUs cleared gaps amounting to over 1600 yards of unobstructed 
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lateral beach to facilitate the Allied landing at Normandy (NSWC, n.d.). However, in 
opening Europe to the Allies, the 16 NCDU teams tasked to Omaha Beach paid a terrible 
price. Of the 175 NCDU personnel assigned to Omaha Beach, 31 were killed in action 
(KIA) and 60 were wounded in action (WIA), incurring a 52% casualty rate in a single day 
(Couch & Doyle, 2014). An additional 6 KIA and 11 WIA were sustained on Utah Beach 
(Couch & Doyle, 2014). 
In the Pacific Theater, the Navy Underwater Demolition Teams were formed 
following the calamitous amphibious assault of Tarawa Atoll (November 20–23, 1943), in 
which nearly 1,000 Marines were killed and 2,000 more were wounded before reaching the 
beach (Couch & Doyle, 2014). Coral reefs that were shallower than expected prevented the 
landing crafts from reaching the beach and forced many Marines to wade ashore under 
heavy enemy fire (Couch & Doyle, 2014). To prevent another unnecessarily tragic 
amphibious assault, Admiral Chester Nimitz established UDT-1 and UDT-2 to provide 
hydrographic reconnaissance and obstacle clearance for future amphibious landing 
operations. Expanding to 34 teams by the end of the war, the UDTs were utilized in every 
major amphibious operation in the Pacific and later assisted in the amphibious landing 
operation at Inchon during the Korean War (NSWC, n.d.). Unfortunately, as was the case 
with the NCDUs in the European theater, the UDTs sustained very high casualty rates. Of 
the 3,500 UDT sailors who served in WWII, 83 were killed (Couch & Doyle, 2014). 
Seeking to repurpose the UDTs to meet the new challenges of the Cold War and 
advance the nation’s unconventional warfare capability, President John F. Kennedy 
authorized the formation of SEAL Team ONE and SEAL Team TWO in 1962 (Couch & 
Doyle, 2014). Formed primarily of UDT sailors, SEAL Team’s ONE and TWO 
immediately deployed to Vietnam. Although deployed initially in an advisory role, the 
SEALs were soon responsible for conducting counter-guerilla warfare and clandestine 
reconnaissance operations throughout Vietnam. With the incorporation of helicopters and 
riverine assault crafts into their operations, the SEAL platoons conducted ambushes, raids, 
reconnaissance patrols, and intelligence collection operations (Couch & Doyle, 2014). In 
addition to the value provided by the intelligence collected and number of South 
Vietnamese resistance fighters trained, the SEAL historian, Dale Andrade, notes in the 
7 
book, Navy SEALs: Their Untold Story, “By the end of 1970s SEALs and their South 
Vietnamese allies had killed more than two thousand Viet Cong and captured about twenty-
seven hundred, many of them important members of the political infrastructure” (Couch & 
Doyle, 2014, p. 117). In addition, SEALs were responsible for six POW rescue operations 
that freed 152 Vietnamese captives, roughly half of all the POWs freed during the conflict 
(Couch & Doyle, 2014). Considering the SEAL teams rarely deployed more than 120 
SEALs to Vietnam at any given time (Couch & Doyle, 2014), a tiny fraction compared to 
the total U.S. military force of 543,400 deployed to Vietnam in 1969 (DMDC, n.d.), it is 
evident the SEALs had an outsized effect on the war. However, during the years of active 
hostilities from 1965 to 1972, 46 SEALs died in battle and many more were wounded in 
action (Couch & Doyle, 2014).  
After the Vietnam War, the SEAL Teams participated in a number of smaller, but 
nonetheless strategic, operations. In Grenada, 1983, SEALs conducted several operations 
ranging from hydrographic reconnaissance to safely rescuing the island’s appointed 
governor during Operation URGENT FURY. Unfortunately, while conducting a parachute 
insertion over open water, four SEALs were killed due to a random squall (Dockery, 2004). 
As part of Operation EARNEST WILL in the Persian Gulf, on 21 September, 1988, SEALs 
boarded and seized an Iranian ship caught laying mines. In doing so, the SEALs not only 
prevented the further mining of the nine mines they found on the ship, but also captured 
documentation showing the locations of the mines already deployed. More importantly, 
their actions exposed Iran to international scrutiny for mining international waters 
(USSOCOM History and Research Office, 2007). During Operation JUST CAUSE, the 
U.S. operation to restore the democratically-elected Panamanian government in 1989, 
SEALs conducted several operations to assist in the effort. Most notably, they prevented 
the escape of the Panamanian dictator, General Manuel Antonio Noriega, by preemptively 
destroying the patrol boat called the Presidente Porras and capturing the personal Learjet 
belonging to the dictator (Dockery, 2004). Their successful efforts at preventing his escape 
came at the staggering cost of four SEALs KIA and another eight WIA (Dockery, 2004). 
During Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (1990-1991), the U.S. operation 
to defend Saudi Arabia and remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the SEAL Teams conducted 
8 
the full gamut of strategic operations that included combat search and rescue, training the 
Saudi and Kuwaiti Special Forces, and most importantly, a successful maritime deception 
operation that diverted several Iraqi divisions away from the main line of attack (Dockery, 
2004). Through the remainder of the 1990s, SEALs were involved in operations in 
Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Liberia (NSWC, n.d.).  
Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, 
the SEAL Teams continued to deliver strategic effects to the battlefield through a multitude 
of mission sets that included direct action, foreign internal defense, counter-insurgency, 
special reconnaissance, and counter-terrorism operations. During Operation ENDURING 
FREEDOM (2001–2014) in Afghanistan, SEAL elements completed more than 75 special 
reconnaissance and direct action missions destroying more than 500,000 pounds of 
explosives and weapons and capturing or killing key enemy personnel (NSWC, n.d.).  
In Iraq, the SEAL Team’s special operations capabilities enabled them to be at the 
forefront of offensive combat operations in both Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (2003–
2011) and Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (2011-present). The most notable 
contributions include: securing critical maritime oil infrastructures, clearing key 
waterways, enabling humanitarian aid deliveries, and conducting reconnaissance and direct 
action raids to capture high value targets, seize suspected chemical, biological and 
radiological sites, and rescue a U.S. prisoner of war (NSWC, n.d.). According to the Navy 
SEAL Foundation, since 2001 there has been a total of 71 Naval Special Warfare operators 
killed in action, 57 of which were SEALs. 
B. BACKGROUND HISTORY OF COMBAT PAY 
Beginning in World War II, the U.S. military has recognized the tremendous 
additional risk of combat with compensation appropriately referred to as “combat pay.” 
What began as Badge Pay in 1944 progressed into Combat Pay during the Korean War and 
ultimately became the current Hostile Fire Pay/Imminent Danger Pay of today. In the effort 
to ensure no deserving combat veteran was ineligible for this supplemental pay, U.S. 
combat pay policy has evolved extensively over the years, expanding eligibility to ever 
greater numbers of service members while slowly loosening its relationship with combat. 
9 
Today’s combat pay policy no longer includes “combat” in the name and is instead called 
Imminent Danger Pay (IDP) or Hostile Fire Pay (HFP) depending on the circumstances 
under which it is received. Although the policy behind combat pay changed substantially 
over time, the original intent of compensating individuals for the heightened risks of 
combat has largely remained constant (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a).  
The most extensive history on combat pay was outlined in a 2011 research paper 
completed for the 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) by 
Brandon Gould and Stanley Horowitz. In their paper, they note that the first combat 
compensation was introduced to frontline ground troops as Badge Pay in June 1944 in 
order to boost morale and equalize the pay differential with the other services entitled to 
various incentive pays. According to background papers from the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USDP&R), submariners had already been receiving 
an extra $5-$15 a month for “the arduous and hazardous nature of submarine duty” since 
1901 (2018, p. 327). Similarly, aviators began receiving “flight pay” in 1913 which 
increased their wages by 35% for “the exceedingly hazardous nature of military flying 
duty” (2018, p. 22). Because Army infantry was engaged in direct combat and sustained 
similar fatality rates to that of both submariners and aviators, Congress eventually agreed 
with the Army infantry leaders and authorized Badge Pay (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). 
Badge Pay constituted an additional $5 per month for an Expert Infantryman Badge, earned 
in infantry training, and $10 per month for the Combat Infantryman Badge, earned in 
combat (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). Though it was first reserved solely for the infantry, it 
later expanded to include combat medics in 1945 (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). However, 
as Gould and Horowitz point out, because Badge Pay was predicated on a single specialty, 
the infantry, other non-infantry specialties such as artillery, special forces, and tank crews 
were ineligible for Badge Pay despite also being exposed to the dangers of combat. While 
not being directly tied to combat, Gould and Horowitz conclude that Badge Pay 
inadvertently established the legacy of “recognition” for the severe demands of combat and 
infantry service (2011a).  
After terminating Badge Pay in 1949, Congress passed the Combat Duty Pay Act 
in 1952 which authorized additional compensation for service members deployed to Korea. 
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This additional compensation was appropriately called “Combat Duty Pay” or “Combat 
Pay” and consisted of $45 per month to service members physically located within Korea 
who either served at least six days in designated “combat units” or were wounded, injured, 
or killed by hostile fire. According to Gould and Horowitz, “combat units” were narrowly 
defined by statute which limited the pay to only the frontline ground troops actively 
engaged in combat. This resulted in many soldiers from “non-combat” units being 
ineligible to receive the added pay even when they were subject to hostile enemy action 
from guerilla warfare and bombings (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). In total, only 15% of the 
entire military and 19% of the Army deployed to Korea received Combat Pay according to 
the Military Personnel Historical Report of 1953 (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). Continuing 
with Gould and Horowitz, the bill also restricted anyone receiving both a specialty or 
incentive pay and Combat Pay. This meant that many fighter pilots or submariners who 
already received special pay were barred from also receiving Combat Pay even if they were 
subject to enemy fire or sustained injury or death in combat. Nevertheless, unlike Badge 
Pay that preceded it, Combat Pay was open to all services and occupational specialties, had 
narrow conditions for what constituted a “combat unit,” and mandated a geographic 
requirement (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). Essentially, combat pay went from being a 
special pay reserved for “badged” infantry—even those not actively engaged in combat—
to more of a risk-based compensatory pay to all service members actively engaged in 
ground combat. Gould and Horowitz contend that one similarity Combat Pay did have to 
Badge Pay was that it was a “recognition” of the extreme “hazards and hardships” frontline 
service members endured in combat. However, as Gould and Horowitz are quick to point 
out, this rationale of “recognition” opened the door for the other services to also demand 
combat pay for the added risks they sustained while in combat. 
This transition from recognizing both the “hazards and hardships” of the frontline 
soldier to just “hazards” or “risk” was realized at the outset of hostilities in Vietnam with 
the Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1963 (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). Renaming Combat 
Duty Pay to Hostile Fire Pay, the Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1963 raised the rate of 
combat pay to $55 per month, delegated administrative discretion of combat pay over to 
the Department of Defense, and removed the statutory restrictions on multiple special and 
11 
incentive pays. Under this special pay provision, service members were eligible for Hostile 
Fire Pay if a service member met one of three conditions: 
1. Was subject to hostile fire or explosion of hostile mines; or 
2. Was on duty in an area in which he was in imminent danger of being 
exposed to hostile fire or explosion of hostile mines and in which, during 
the period he was on duty in that area, other members of the uniformed 
services were subject to hostile fire or explosion of hostile mines; or 
3. Was killed, injured, or wounded by hostile fire, explosion of a hostile 
mine, or any other hostile action. (37 U.S.C., Section 310) 
Gould and Horowitz note that delegating the discretion to the Secretary of Defense 
eliminated the need for future authorizations and provided the Department of Defense with 
more flexibility to better respond to emerging theaters of conflict. Additionally, without a 
ban on multiple special and incentive pays, eligibility from other services increased. 
However, unlike WWII in which the fatality rates of pilots and submariners were fairly 
similar to the frontline soldier, in Vietnam the rates were considerably lower. This raised a 
controversy with many believing that pilots and submariners were already being 
compensated for the heightened risks in their own specialty with specialty pay, and 
therefore, did not need to be further compensated for combat (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). 
In effect, these changes diluted the original purpose of recognizing the unique “hazards 
and hardships” of the frontline soldier and refocused the compensation towards a broader 
“recognition for risk” standard (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a).  
Because there was no longer a ban on multiple special and incentive pays, the 
justification behind combat pay shifted from the need to recognize the dual standards of 
both the “hardships and hazards” of the frontline soldier to solely recognizing the “hazard” 
of the frontline soldier (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). If the “hazards” were equal to that of 
the frontline soldier, then combat pay was deserved regardless of hardship. Thus, if the 
“hazard” or “risk” of combat was identical for both ground troops and bomber pilots, then 
the bomber pilots should also be recognized with combat pay. However, over time the 
degree of hazard or risk warranting “recognition” with combat pay lowered from the level 
of the frontline soldier to any level of risk (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a).  
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Although Congress provided increased discretion to the Secretary of Defense in the 
administration of Hostile Fire Pay to allow for greater flexibility and responsiveness, the 
lawmakers believed the Department of Defense would keep the pay aligned with the 
narrow eligibility criteria presented in the Combat Duty Pay Act of 1952, and at first it did 
(Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). According to Gould and Horowitz, the Secretary of Defense 
kept the narrow interpretation of the Uniformed Services Pay Act by issuing the first draft 
of the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1340.6 in November of 1963 which 
maintained much of the same provisions found in the Combat Duty Pay Act of 1952 such 
as the six-day service requirement and limitation on the size of a “combat unit.” As a result 
of this narrow interpretation, only 25% of the personnel stationed in the Vietnam theater 
of operations received Hostile Fire Pay between 1963–1965, according to the report for the 
1971 QRMC.  
Then, in 1965, the Secretary of Defense made three notable changes to DODI 
1340.6 for administering Hostile Fire Pay (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). The first change 
expanded eligibility for all personnel across all services to “areas designated by the 
Secretary of Defense” (p. 33). The second change eliminated the 6-day requirement. And 
finally, the third change extended Hostile Fire Pay to any member “killed, wounded, or 
injured by hostile fire, explosion of hostile mines, or any other hostile action any place in 
the world” (p. 33).  
Together, these changes transformed the eligibility for Hostile Fire Pay and 
immediately increased the total number of HFP recipients by 500% reaching a height of 
300,000 recipients in 1965 (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). By 1968, the number of HFP 
recipients peaked at 1.25 million (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). According to Gould and 
Horowitz, the first change removing the “unit-based” restrictions eliminated any notion 
that combat pay was reserved for the frontline soldier and their associated “hardships.” 
Instead, for any service member not actually killed, injured, or wounded by hostile action, 
Hostile Fire Pay became entirely dependent on risk determined solely by where a service 
member was physically located. There was now no longer a distinction between the level 
of risk the frontline soldier sustained and those working outside of combat as long as they 
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were within the same “area” designated by the Secretary of Defense (Gould & Horowitz, 
2011a). 
Once the hostilities in Vietnam ended, the recipients of HFP lowered to a sparse 
few and it was not until the 1983 bombing of the Marine Corp barracks in Lebanon which 
killed 241 service members that Congress sought to provide additional compensation to 
recognize risk even when there was no hostile fire that would warrant HFP (Gould & 
Horowitz, 2011a). Under current legislation, the Marines in Lebanon were not receiving 
any additional compensation for the risk of being in a dangerous area prior to the bombing. 
Arguably, despite the lack of active hostile fire within Lebanon, the Marines sustained high 
amounts of risk and deserved extra compensation just by being physically located in 
Lebanon.  
Consequently, in the 1984 Department of Defense Authorization Act, Congress 
extended combat pay to include those “on duty in a foreign area in which the member was 
subject to the threat of physical harm or imminent danger on the basis of civil insurrection, 
civil war, terrorism, or wartime conditions” (37 U.S.C., Section 310). Now, all service 
members were eligible to receive what is commonly referred to as Imminent Danger Pay 
(IDP) without the requirement of actually being exposed to combat so long as they were in 
an “imminent danger zone” approved by the Secretary of Defense. As a result of this new 
expansion of combat pay, the number of personnel across the DOD eligible for IDP/HFP 
went from a low of 4 in 1982 to 3,646 in 1984 (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a).  
Although this newly relaxed requirement did well to recognize the risk in low-level 
conflicts, once large-scale hostilities began in 2003, the disparity of risk between those 
actually in combat and those just residing in an “imminent danger zone” became more 
apparent (Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). Now, there were large contingents of soldiers 
engaging the enemy in direct combat and sustaining higher fatality rates than any of the 
other low-intensity conflicts of the ’70s, ’80s, and ’90s. Yet, despite the differences in risk 
between the different theaters, the compensation remained the same. Non-combat 
deployments to the Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa received the same compensation as 
combat deployments to Anbar Province, Iraq, despite vast differences in the level of risk 
(Gould & Horowitz, 2011a). Recognizing this disparity, in 2003 President George W. Bush 
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attempted to create two tiers of HFP/IDP by extending a temporary increase in HFP/IDP 
from $150/month to $225/month for only those operating in Iraq and Afghanistan (Gould 
& Horowitz, 2011a). However, fearing that extending the HFP/IDP raise to only service 
members in Iraq and Afghanistan would amount to a pay cut for all other IDP locations, 
Congress permanently extended the raise to all imminent danger zones worldwide (Gould 
& Horowitz, 2011a).  
There have been no significant changes to combat pay policy since the 2003 
IDP/HFP increase. Present combat pay policy consists of $225/month for any service 
member located in any imminent danger zone designated by the Secretary of Defense or 
those service members who meet the HFP requirements. Since 2001, of the nearly 80 areas 
designated as imminent danger zones, 36 have been undesignated (Asch et al., 2019). To 
date, there are 42 areas designated as imminent danger zones including Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Yemen, Egypt, Djibouti, Israel, Malaysia, and 35 others (DOD, 2020a).  
C. SPECIAL AND INCENTIVE PAYS 
In addition to combat pay, there are other special pays (also referred to as incentive 
pays) to the military base salary for those that qualify. Special pays are generally applied 
for one of two purposes: to incentivize service members to meet manpower requirements 
or to compensate service members for higher-risk, more-arduous service conditions or 
sometimes both (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness [USDP&R], 
2018). Arguably, these pays also compensate service members for increased risk. In 
addition to incentivizing service members to take on the higher-risk, less-desirable 
occupations, special pays also provide greater compensation to match levels offered in the 
civilian sector for similar occupations (USDP&R, 2018). Unlike combat pay which offers 
a flat amount for all ranks and specialties, special pays vary based on the rank and years in 
service.  
Without special incentive pays, there would likely be fewer service members who 
would volunteer or continue to serve in less desirable or more arduous jobs such as 
submarine and sea duty. As a result, there are special incentive pays for both submarine 
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and sea duty called Submarine Duty Incentive Pay ($75-$835/month) (Military.com, n.d.) 
and Sea Pay ($60-$805/month) (Absher, 2020), respectively.  
There is also a special pay designed to compensate for additional “hardship” 
experienced by a service member called Hardship Duty Pay which can be distributed on 
the basis of location, mission, operational tempo, and restriction of movement (DOD, 
2018). The one most often used, Hardship Duty Pay-Location (HDP-L), is provided to 
compensate service members ordered to live in “locations where living conditions are 
substantially below those normally found within the continental United States” (DOD, 
2018). Currently, there are over 150 designated areas entitled to HDP-L ranging from $50 
to $150. In locations where service members are also entitled to IDP/HFP, HDP-L is 
capped at $100/month (DOD, 2018). Consequently, service members in Iraq and 
Afghanistan receive a total of $325 in extra pay consisting of $100 from HDP-L and $225 
from IDP/HFP.  
Other specialty pays, called Hazardous Duty Incentive Pays, attempt to compensate 
service members for the duties or skills that present an increased risk to the service member 
(DOD, 2019b). Such pays include Dive Pay ($340/month), Parachute Pay ($150-
$225/month), Demolition Pay ($150/month), and Flight Deck Duty Pay ($150/month) 
(Powers, 2019). Rather than issuing three separate pays for dive, parachute, and demolition, 
Navy SEALs are compensated with a single pay called Skills Incentive Pay ($515-
$715/month) to compensate for the total increased risk acquired from conducting high risk 
activities in both training and while deployed (Navy Personnel Command, n.d.). Combat 
pay or IDP/HFP, is considered a type of Hazardous Duty Incentive Pay.  
D. OTHER COMBAT COMPENSATION: COMBAT ZONE TAX 
EXCLUSION 
Although not directly tied to combat or risk, U.S. military personnel also receive 
tax benefits for military pay earned during wartime. Military tax exclusion benefits have 
been federal policy since World War I and continues under the present policy called 
Combat Zone Tax Exclusion (CZTE) (Gould & Horowitz, 2011b). Following the 
ratification of the 16th Amendment authorizing the first federal income tax in 1913, 
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Congressional legislators believed that those serving in the war should not also be burdened 
with having to fund the war (Gould & Horowitz, 2011). Thus, once the U.S. entered World 
War I, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1918 providing a $3,500 tax exclusion benefit 
for all military personnel in an attempt to restore tax liabilities for military service members 
to pre-war levels (Gould & Horowitz, 2011). Over time, the policy surrounding the 
exclusion of military pay from federal income taxes has been amended over the years. The 
most notable change occurred in the Revenue Act of 1950 in which Congress limited the 
tax benefit to only the service members physically serving in the Korean conflict rather 
than providing it to all service members regardless of location as was the norm during WWI 
and WWII (Gould & Horowitz, 2011). At present, CZTE allows all military personnel to 
exclude military pay earned while in one of the 17 currently-designated combat zones 
(DOD, 2019a). For enlisted service members, the excludable amount is unlimited. For 
commissioned officers, the excludable amount is limited to the maximum enlisted pay 
allowance for that year.  Currently, the maximum enlisted pay allowance is set at $8,844 
per month (Combat Zone Tax Exclusions, n.d.). Despite slight modifications over the 
years, the military wartime tax exclusion was never intended to compensate warfighters 
for risks sustained in combat, but rather, to avoid administering a dual penalty for service 
members having to both finance and fight a war.  
E. PREVIOUS ACADEMIC STUDIES 
Previous studies have assessed both the effectiveness and equity of IDP/HFP and 
CZTE by analyzing the distribution of such combat compensation across a variety of 
demographics and combat zones. A study in 2011 by Pleeter et al. titled Risk and Combat 
Compensation analyzed the distribution of IDP payments across all the designated combat 
zones eligible for IDP and found that Iraq and Afghanistan contained 98.1% of all the 
fatalities during 2003–2009, yet received only 55.2% of the entire distribution of combat 
pay (2011). In addition, Pleeter et al. found that for 2007, Afghanistan and Iraq had the 
highest casualty rates of 1.26% and 1.22%, respectively, while the remaining combat zones 
were all under 0.2% if not outright zero. Consequently, Pleeter et al.’s study illustrates the 
wide disparity of risk between combat zones and how the current distribution of combat 
pay across combat zones disregards risk differentials. 
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In the same 2011 study, Pleeter et al. also sought to determine whether or not the 
casualty rates were spread equally among the ranks. As combat pay (IDP/HFP) is identical 
across all pay grades, this would identify if combat pay was being effectively distributed 
or if it should be directed towards the pay grades that were most “at risk.” Not surprisingly, 
Pleeter et al. found that the casualty rates peaked at the rank of E-2 for enlisted and O-1 for 
officers and steadily declined as the pay grade increased (2011).  
To further accentuate this imbalance of risk and monetary compensation, Pleeter et 
al. also determined that the higher ranks received the most benefit in combat compensation 
due to Combat Zone Tax Exclusion (2011). As previously stated, the current CZTE policy 
allows enlisted to exclude their total income and officers to exclude up to the highest 
enlisted income, currently at $8,844 per month (Military Compensation, n.d.). Thus, the 
higher the pay grade, the more money earned in base salary, and therefore the more tax 
benefits received from the federal tax exclusion. In addition, as Pleeter et al. identifies, 
CZTE introduces another tax benefit, the Earned Income Tax Credit, or EIC, which 
provides additional compensation for those who exclude enough income to be eligible. For 
example, under the current policy, an O-6 with two children deployed for 11 months in a 
combat zone can reduce taxable income to $7,000 and earn an extra $5,036 in EIC benefit 
(Pleeter et al., 2011). Moreover, Pleeter et al. estimated that there were approximately 
200,000 officers earning over $100,000 that were eligible for the earned income tax credit 
in 2011. In a separate study that further highlights the disparity of combat compensation 
by rank, the authors state, “Under today’s exclusion, an O-6 deployed to Bahrain receives 
almost quadruple the tax benefits of an E-3 serving in Baghdad. Note also that a service 
member dying from hostile fire outside a designated combat zone receives no benefits and 
must pay tax on any outstanding income or estate liabilities” (Gould & Horowitz, 2011b, 
p. 30). 
Following the results of Pleeter et al.’s study, in 2018, Armey et al. completed an 
analysis of combat risk for various demographics in the paper titled Combat, Casualties, 
and Compensation: Evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan. By analyzing the fatality rates of 
deployed service members to Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001–2012, Armey et al. 
discovered that deployed service members had an increased likelihood of death of 48 per 
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100,000 than non-deployed military service members who remained stateside (2018). 
Moreover, Armey et al. discovered that fatality risk was not equally shared across the 
services. The Army had the highest increased likelihood of death at 65.7 deaths per 100,000 
while the Air Force actually had a negative change in the likelihood of death at -7.43 per 
100,000, that is they were less likely to die in a combat theater than they were stateside. 
Furthermore, Armey et al. found the most significant disparity in risk occurred between 
combat and non-combat jobs. Personnel assigned to combat units experienced the most 
dramatic increase in likelihood of death at 180 per 100,000 as a result of an Iraq or 
Afghanistan deployment while those in non-combat job types experienced a lower fatality 
risk compared to stateside. Finally, to recommend a compensation level commensurate 
with the level of risk from combat, Armey et al. used the Department of Transportation’s 
2016 Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) at $9.6 million and the average additional likelihood 
of death at 48 per 100,000 to calculate a monthly compensation value of $808 per month 
(pp. 17–18). Although the current IDP/HFP amount of $225 per month is considerably 
lower than the $808 per month, it is important to note the additional tax benefit provided 
by CZTE, which according to Pleeter et al. is 4.5 times greater than the compensation 
provided through IDP on average (2011). However, one must also note that CZTE most 
significantly benefits the higher pay grades who are the least likely to endure combat and 
have the lowest fatality rates (Pleeter et al., 2011). Finally, as risk was not evenly 
distributed between service and job types, Armey et al. further recommends that combat 
compensation should be adjusted on the basis of service or job type to more effectively and 
equitable allocate combat pay to the service members who sustain the most risk (2018). 
At the request of the Department of Defense to fulfill a directive in the 2019 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the RAND Corporation, an independent 
research organization, conducted an evaluation of the current system for awarding combat 
pay to determine if the current methodology is “effective in meeting the needs of service 
members or whether an alternative approach based on deployments would be more 
appropriate” (Asch et al., 2019, p. ix). Specifically, the FY 2019 NDAA asked, “Is the 
current IDP process effective? Does it meet the needs of service members, including 
special operations forces?” The resulting evaluation titled An Examination on the 
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Methodology for Awarding Imminent Danger Pay and Hostile Fire Pay provided two 
notable recommendations for improving the current combat pay policy. The first 
recommendation was to “create tiered rates of IDP based on severity of threat. Setting IDP 
to reflect different levels of exposure to danger would address inequities among members 
who currently receive the same pay but face different exposure” (Asch, pp. xi). The second 
recommendation called to “increase the current $225 rate for HFP and IDP. IDP should be 
increased to restore its real value since 2003 and to exceed the $250-per-month Family 
Separation Allowance” (Asch, pp. xii). Overall, the RAND Corporation found that 
IDP/HFP was relevant and effective, but that changes needed to be made “to better align 
the pay to exposure to danger” (p. 47). 
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Data was compiled from the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) to identify and profile all active duty enlisted Navy SEAL 
operators deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan and those stationed in the United States 
for the years 2007–2012. The data from the SSA provides the date of death for all Navy 
SEALs who died during 2007–2012 regardless of where the death occurred. By 
comparison, data from the DMDC provides the descriptive characteristics for each SEAL 
operator such as age, marital status, number of dependents, education, and race. Data from 
the DMDC also identifies whether or not a SEAL operator deployed in a given year and if 
so which country the operator deployed to.  
One limitation in the data compiled is that the data set does not cover the entire 
duration for the main years of U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ideally, this 
research would have included data from the years 2001–2007 as Navy SEAL operations 
into Afghanistan and Iraq began in 2001 and 2003 respectively. Also, doing so would 
enable a more complete analysis and be better aligned with the results from Armey et al., 
but unfortunately, this was not possible due to data collation issues at the DMDC.  
However, Navy SEALs were deployed in both Iraq and Afghanistan during the 
2007–2012 time period and the data set is reflective of the routine danger assumed during 
kinetic combat deployments normally associated with Special Operations Forces (SOF). 
Conversely, it is important to note that in the six years between 2001 and 2007 there were 
18 SEALs KIA, whereas in the five years between 2007 and 2012 there were 31 SEALs 
KIA. This two-fold increase in fatalities from 2007 to 2012 is largely attributed to a 
catastrophic event that resulted in 17 SEALs KIA in one day.7 Although this likely skewed 
the results to reflect a higher likelihood of death, it is important to remember that combat 
fatality rates are largely dependent on the size of the deployed force and without the data 
                                                 
7 On August 6, 2011, an enemy rocket hit and destroyed a helicopter in Afghanistan killing all 38 
personnel onboard to include 17 SEAL operators (Pruitt, 2018). 
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from 2001–2007, it is impossible to determine the extent to which the results are skewed. 
Figure 1 displays the distribution of SEAL combat deaths from 2001–2012. 
 
Figure 1. Navy SEAL Combat Fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan by Year. 
Adapted from Defense Manpower Data Center (2020).  
Not having the data from 2001–2007 also presents another limitation to the data by 
further reducing an already small sample size. Although Navy SEALs sustain relatively 
high casualty rates for their small force size, the actual numbers of KIA deaths in the 
sample—31—are too low to achieve a high degree of certainty that the results are not 
caused by random chance. Consequently, only the first column in Table 2 is within a 10% 
statistical significance level. Still, the remaining columns in Table 2 are all within a 15% 
statistical significance level. However, Table 3, which estimates the same effect as Table 
2 but with a different regression method, is statistically significant at the 1% level. For 
Table 4, all the estimates are at the 10% statistical significance level. 
Table 1 provides the descriptive characteristics for the entire data set of deployed 
and non-deployed Navy SEALs between 2007–2012. From nearly 10,500 observations in 
the data set, Navy SEALs experienced an overall fatality rate of 0.31% and a combat 























otherwise, that occurred while deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan or from an injury sustained 
in Iraq or Afghanistan. The 0.07% difference between overall fatalities and combat 
fatalities can be attributed to stateside deaths likely occurring in training and other 
accidental deaths. The data set shows 35% of the observations were deployed for any given 
year and 58% were married. The average age of a SEAL operator in the data set was 31.8 
years. The data set is comprised of 11.5% Hispanic, 2% Asian, and 86.5% other ethnicity 
with 90% White, 3% Black, and 7% other. Finally, within this data set of enlisted SEAL 
operators, 79% completed high school, 4% completed some college, 13% completed a 4-
year college, and 1% completed schooling beyond college.  
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
Death 10,491 0.0031 0.056 0 1 
Combat Death 10,491 0.0024 0.047 0 1 
Deployed 10,491 0.35 0.48 0 1 
      
Married 10,491 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Number of Dependents 10,491 1.31 1.40 0 7 
Age 10,491 31.75 7.20 19 65 
      
Hispanic 10,005 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Asian 10,005 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Other Ethnicity 10,005 0.87 0.34 0 1 
Black 10,020 0.03 0.16 0 1 
White 10,020 0.90 0.30 0 1 
Other Race 10,020 0.07 0.26 0 1 
      
      
Less than High School 10,083 0.03 0.18 0 1 
High School 10,083 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Some College 10,083 0.04 0.20 0 1 
College (4-year degree) 10,083 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Beyond College 10,083 0.01 0.08 0 1 
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In summary, when compared to the data set of overall U.S. active duty military 
personnel from Armey et al. (2018), an enlisted Navy SEAL operator is 20% more likely 
to die stateside, about nine times more likely to die in Iraq and Afghanistan, 150% more 
likely to be deployed, 16% more likely to be married, and three years older.8  
 
                                                 
8 From a data set of over 17 million observations of U.S. active duty military service members from 
2001–2012, Armey et al. found the overall fatality rate to be 0.0854%, combat fatality to be 0.0272%, 




The previous research conducted by Armey et al. (2018) used an estimation strategy 
that measured fatalities to estimate “deployment risk.” Specifically, Armey et al. compared 
“fatalities of stateside U.S. service members with those deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan” 
(p. 8) across the four major armed services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) and job 
types (Combat, Support, Service and Other). However, no analysis was completed for any 
of the USSOF units. Staying consistent with the estimation strategy presented in Armey et 
al., this research compares the fatalities of Navy SEALs deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan 
with those that occurred within the United States to identify the added risk assumed while 
deployed.  
Consistent with Armey et al. (2018), to identify the effect of deployment into combat 
zones on fatality rates for active duty Navy SEALs, the following multi linear regression model 
from Armey et al. was used, 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where Fatalityit assumes a value of one if the SEAL operator i dies in year t and zero otherwise. 
Similar to Armey et al., the binary indicator variable Deploymentit is equal to one if the SEAL 
operator i is deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan in year t and zero if stationed in the U.S. 
for the entire year. As specified by Armey et al., the vector 𝑋𝑋′ is a set of individual control 
variables which include age, marital status, number of dependents, level of education, race, 
ethnicity, battalion fixed effects, time fixed effects, and ε, an idiosyncratic error term. Finally, 
as stated by Armey et al., “β is the coefficient of interest and can be interpreted as the effect of 
being deployed into a combat zone on death” (2018, p. 8). 
B. RESULTS 
Table 2 displays the linear regression results from comparing all deployed active 
duty Navy SEALs to Iraq or Afghanistan to non-deployed Navy SEALs remaining 
stateside from 2007–2012. Table 2 is separated into four columns for the various 
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permutations of control variables and the effects from unit and length of time. The only 
column to reach statistical significance is column 1 with no control variables or unit and 
time fixed effects. This is likely due to the limited sample size. The coefficients in the first 
row are all positive indicating an increase in the risk of death for deployed Navy SEALs to 
Iraq or Afghanistan compared to those remaining stateside. The coefficients range between 
0.0048 and 0.0053 corresponding to an increased likelihood of death ranging from 480 per 
100,000 to 530 per 100,000 for deployed SEALs in Iraq or Afghanistan compared to non-
deployed SEALs stationed stateside. Column 1 has a statistically significant coefficient at 
the 10% level. Columns 2, 3, and 4 have statistically significant coefficients under the 15% 
level. Column 1 provides the best estimate as it is not only statistically significant, but it 
also does not incorporate unnecessary control variables such as age, race, ethnicity, and 
education which should have no impact on the likelihood of death in a war zone. 
Additionally, because columns 1 and 3 are identical, it appears that incorporating the unit 
and time fixed effects has no effect on the coefficient. The preferred estimate in column 4 
suggests that Navy SEALs deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan in a given year experienced an 
increased likelihood of death of 530 per 100,000 compared to non-deployed Navy SEALs 
remaining stateside. 
Table 2. The Incremental Effect of Deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan on 
Death for Navy SEALs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)      
Deployment 0.0053 * 0.004800 0.005300 0.004900 
 (0.0031) (0.003) (0.0036) (0.0035) 
     
Control Variables? No Yes No Yes 
Unit and Time Fixed Effects? No No Yes Yes 
     
Observations 10,491 9,220 10,491 9,220 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are 
clusters at the unit (i.e., battalion) level. Control variables include married, number of dependents, age, gender, 
race, ethnicity, and education. Time fixed effects include year dummy variables. The linear probability model 
shown in this table has the primary outcome variable (i.e., Fatalityit) take a value of 1 if soldier i is killed in 
year t and zero otherwise. 
27 
Given the low levels of statistical significance in the linear models, a logistic or 
logit regression was also performed to determine if it yielded similar results. Where linear 
models are more intuitive to interpret the average marginal effects, logit models are better 
suited for binary variables with limited or rare outcome effects (Wooldridge, 2010). Given 
the relative infrequency of death, this model may produce more accurate results. In the 
previous research done by Armey et al., linear probability models were used to estimate 
the marginal effect of deployment on death. However, because those regressions analyzed 
the effect for all U.S. service members deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, they contained 
many more observations allowing for a greater statistical significance level. Due to the 
non-linear shape of the logistic curve, marginal effects are different depending on where a 
variable is measured in the logit model. However, they are often estimated from logits 
either using the average of all covariates or averaging all the marginal effects. In this model, 
the average effects are estimated by averaging all the marginal effects. One issue with logit 
is that it is unable to include observations from variables that predict 1 or 0 outcomes 
perfectly. This means that any battalion with no fatalities is dropped from the analysis. 
Moreover, we are unable to estimate the models in Table 4 with logit because non-
deployments are coded as having a 0 probability of death while deployed. For these 
reasons, only columns 1 and 2 present accurate results while columns 3 and 4 should be 
disregarded.  
Results from the logit regression reveal coefficients for the average marginal effects 
ranging between 0.00526 and 0.00528 corresponding to an increased likelihood of death 
of 526–528 per 100,000 for SEAL operators deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan in any given 
year between 2007–2012 compared to those stateside. These results are consistent with the 
preferred estimate from Table 2 of 0.0053 and are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Although the logit regression garnered a better statistical significance level, this thesis uses 
the linear model for further extrapolation to maintain consistency with previous research 
and ease of understanding. 
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Table 3. The Incremental Effect of Deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan on 
Death for Navy SEALs (Logistic Regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)      
Deployment 1.61*** 1.56*** 0.98** 0.866* 
 (0.47) (0.422) (0.457) (0.46) 
Average Marginal Effects 0.00526 0.00528 0.0003 0.01 
     
Control Variables? No Yes No Yes 
Unit and Time Fixed Effects? No No Yes Yes 
     
Observations 10,491 8,623 5,320 5,139 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are 
clusters at the unit (i.e., battalion) level. Control variables include married, number of dependents, age, gender, 
race, ethnicity, and education. Time fixed effects include year dummy variables. The logit probability model 
shown in this table has the primary outcome variable (i.e., Fatalityit) take a value of 1 if soldier i is killed in 
year t and zero otherwise. 
 
Where Table 2 and Table 3 demonstrate the increased likelihood of death as a result 
of a combat deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan, Table 4 presents the total likelihood of 
death for all enlisted Navy SEAL operators deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan from 2007–
2012. Essentially, Table 4 assumes the chance of death stateside is zero so every combat 
death that occurs in Iraq or Afghanistan is accounted for in the prediction coefficient. Table 
4 can also be interpreted as the upper bound for the increased likelihood of death presented 
in Table 2 and Table 3. Again, there are four columns with coefficients representing the 
total effect deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan has on fatalities. All four coefficients have 
positive values indicating deployments have a positive relationship on fatalities. The 
coefficients range from 0.0062 to 0.008 corresponding to a total likelihood of death that is 
between 620 per 100,000 and 800 per 100,000 for a deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. 
All four coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level, but the preferred estimate 
for Table 4 is column 3. Similar to Table 2, column 3 does not account for the unnecessary 
control variables, but unlike in Table 2, column 3 accounts for unit and time fixed effects 
which does appear to have an effect on the regression. In this case, the preferred estimate 
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suggests the total likelihood of death for a Navy SEAL deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan in 
a given year is 800 per 100,000.  
Table 4. The Likelihood of Death on Deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan for 
Navy SEALs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)      
Deployment 0.0066 * 0.0062* 0.008* 0.007* 
 (0.0037) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Control Variables? No Yes No Yes 
Unit and Time Fixed Effects? No No Yes Yes 
     
Observations 10,491 9,220 10,491 9,220 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are 
clusters at the unit (i.e., battalion) level. Control variables include married, number of dependents, age, 
gender, race, ethnicity, and education. Time fixed effects include year dummy variables. The linear 
probability model shown in this table has the primary outcome variable (i.e., Fatalityit) takes a value of 1 if 
soldier i is killed in year t and zero otherwise. 
 
As noted by Armey et al. (2018), the average deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan 
increased the service members chance of death by 48 per 100,000 which is 15 times higher 
than the national workplace average in 2012 (See Figure 2). Similarly, deployed Navy 
SEALs to Iraq or Afghanistan experience an increased chance of death that is over 165 
times higher than the average civilian job and a total likelihood of death that is 250 times 
higher than the civilian national average. Moreover, when compared to logging workers, 
the most dangerous non-military occupation with a fatality rate of 128 per 100,000, Navy 
SEALs deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan experience four times an increase in fatality risk 
and six times a total fatality risk (U.S. Department of Labor, 2013).  
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Figure 2. U.S. Civilian Occupations with High Fatal Injury Rates, 2012. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMBAT PAY POLICY 
Under the current policy for combat pay, every service member who is within a 
designated combat zone receives the full amount of IDP/HFP of $225/month regardless of 
pay grade, job description, or risk. However, instead of basing combat pay on some 
arbitrary amount, one could base combat pay on the cost of the additional risk assumed for 
deploying to a combat theater (Armey et al., 2018). This research has shown that Navy 
SEALs sustain an increased risk of death of 530 per 100,000 compared to Navy SEALs 
located stateside. Additionally, the Department of Transportation has estimated the 
national Value of a Statistical Life for 2019 at $10.9 million9 (Department of 
Transportation, 2016). By multiplying the 2019 VSL ($10.9 million) by the probability of 
death, it is possible to estimate an expected value of compensation for the added risk of a 
combat deployment for a SEAL operator. Thus, a risk-based compensation amount for a 
SEAL combat deployment is equal to: 0.0053 x $10.9 million = $57,000. This amount can 
further be converted to a monthly basis by dividing the total by the average length of a 
SEAL deployment. The data show an average SEAL deployment from 2007–2012 was 
equal to 4 months. Consequently, the monthly compensation for the extra risk a SEAL 
sustains during a combat deployment is: $57,770 / 4 months = $14,442/month.  
Although $14,442/month is a large monthly wage increase, it is not an abnormal 
compensation level compared to the civilian sector for similar occupation profiles. Indeed, 
SOF personnel are often solicited for contractor jobs that require similar skillsets and 
experience. In 2004, such jobs were offering upwards of $100,000-$200,000 per year 
(Schmitt & Shanker, 2004). Assuming the demand for contractor jobs has remained the 
same, those same jobs in 2019 would be offering between $135,000-$270,000 accounting 
for inflation. By comparison, in 2019 an E-6 Navy SEAL living in Virginia Beach, VA 
with at least six years of experience and no dependents will earn a monthly stipend of 
                                                 
9 The Department of Transportation’s 2016 VSL estimate of $9.6 million was updated to $10.9 million 
to account for real wage growth and inflation up through 2019 (Department of Transportation, 2016). 
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$5,671.10 This translates into a yearly wage of $68,052. If the same SEAL operator 
conducted a 12-month deployment to Afghanistan or Iraq and earned an additional 
$14,442/month in combat pay, he would receive a yearly total of $241,356—roughly 
equivalent to the market rate for contractors in 2004.  
Furthermore, there are many other risks which can leave an operator severely and 
permanently disabled that were not included in this research. Such risks include the risk of 
being physically and mentally wounded in combat or injured during high-risk training 
evolutions. Although outcomes from those risks are compensated by ex-post recompences 
such as medical and disability pay, they are incredibly destructive to the individual and the 
pay can never recover what was lost.  
There are several recommendations that would make the current combat pay policy 
more equitable. Previous authors have noted how the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion policy 
mostly benefits the pay grades with the lowest risk, and proposed recommendations such 
as a tax credit to correct for the regressive nature of the current tax exclusion policy (Pleeter 
et al., 2011; Armey et al., 2018). However, as noted earlier, the original purpose of CZTE 
was never to compensate service members for the additional risk sustained in combat, but 
rather to avoid making service members both pay and fight for the war (Gould & Horowitz, 
2011b). Policy makers will need to decide if the current purpose of Combat Zone Tax 
Exclusion is to compensate service members for the risk of deploying to a combat zone, 
and if it is, then should consider options such as a standard tax credit to correct for the 
regressive nature of the current CZTE policy. 
Other authors, such as the RAND Corporation, have recommended creating tiered 
levels for IDP based on the severity of risk, but noted doing so would require specifying 
the severity of threat (Asch et al., 2019). Fortunately, this research in conjunction with that 
from Armey et al. (2018), measures the “severity of threat” using fatality rates and 
quantified the wage differential appropriate to the risk across various job types. Although 
                                                 
10 In 2019, an E6 SEAL operator earned $3,254 in base salary (2019 Pay Chart, n.d.), $590 in Skills 
Incentive Pay (Navy Personnel Command, n.d.), $369 in Basic Allowance for Subsistence (DOD, 2020c), 
and $1,458 in Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH Calculator, n.d.). 
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the Navy SEALs (and presumably other USSOF units)11 sustained the highest amount of 
risk, Armey et al. discovered a significant difference in risk between combat specialties 
and non-combat specialties (Armey et al., 2018). Consequently, a more effective and 
equitable manner to distribute combat pay would be to have multiple tiers based on the 
severity of threat by job occupation. For example, a three-tiered system for IDP would 
enable non-combat, combat, and SOF occupations to each be recognized for the relative 
risks they assume while deployed to a combat zone. Even a two-tiered system—one for 
combat specialties and one for non-combat specialties—would be more equitable than the 
current combat pay policy while maintaining parity in pay between conventional and SOF 
service members.  
However, a multi-tiered system for IDP still does not alleviate the problems 
identified in Badge Pay in which all soldiers were given extra pay, regardless of their 
proximity to combat. Put simply, not all personnel in a combat specialty are engaged in 
combat in a war zone. Many, including some Navy SEALs, remain in headquarter elements 
inside the wire and never experience combat. It would be widely apparent and grossly 
inequitable for service members in a combat specialty such as infantry to receive the higher 
rate of combat pay despite being assigned to a non-combat job.  
To alleviate this concern, a more equitable manner to reform combat pay would be 
to separate IDP from HFP by raising the compensation level for HFP and limit the statutory 
clause providing HFP to those who were within an area in which there was imminent 
danger of hostile fire to just those in a “combat unit.” This would ensure that all service 
members engaged in actual combat receive HFP and that only those service members in a 
combat “unit” —those that are most likely to be engaged in combat—receive the higher 
rated HFP, while also recognizing the lower risks for most other service members in non-
combat roles with IDP.  
                                                 
11 As most USSOF were executing similar mission sets and conducting operations with similar risks, 
it can be generally presumed that the added risk of death for all USSOF (Army SOF, Air Force SOF, 




For a revenue neutral option, one could lower the rate for IDP and put the difference 
in HFP (or a higher tiered IDP). For example, using a conservative estimate from a study 
that found combat troops composed 40% of the total deployed military force in Iraq, 2005, 
(McGrath, 2007), lowering IDP to $150 for the non-combat force would allow for an 
increase to $337/month for a higher tiered combat pay (IDP or HFP) without changing the 
overall military obligation for combat pay. Doing so would raise combat pay for the combat 
troops to a level above the $250/month Family Separation Allowance alleviating some of 
the concerns brought forward from a survey conducted by Asch et al. Furthermore, if one 
were to adjust for inflation since the last IDP/HFP increase in 2003, it would further raise 
the revenue neutral option to $476/month for 2020. However, as noted by Asch et al., a 
raise in HFP above $450 would require congressional action (2019).  
In summary, to equitably allocate combat pay on the basis of risk, combat pay 
should be reformed to have either multiple tiers of IDP that reflect the different levels of 
risk by job occupation or a higher level of compensation for HFP. For Navy SEALs, the 
risk estimates provided in this study indicate that SEAL operators deployed to a combat 
zone should receive either IDP or HFP in the amount of $14,442/month. Further risk 
assessments on the basis of job occupation should be done to develop appropriate risk-




This thesis presented research into the fatality risk for U.S. Navy Special Warfare 
(SEAL) operators deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan from 2007–2012 using restricted data 
from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and Social Security Administration 
(SSA). The effect a deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan had on casualties for Navy SEALs 
from 2007–2012 was determined using a multivariate linear regression using stateside 
SEAL operators as the control group and deployed SEAL operators in Iraq or Afghanistan 
as the treatment group. This thesis also presented a risk-based compensation level for 
deployed U.S. Navy SEALs. 
In summary, the results presented here show SEAL operators deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan in 2007–2012 experienced a total likelihood of death of 800 per 100,000 and 
an increased likelihood of death of 530 per 100,000 compared to the SEAL operators who 
remained stateside. An appropriate compensation amount for that level of additional risk 
was estimated at $14,442/month using a 2019 VSL estimate from the Department of 
Transportation. This compensating wage differential contrasts with the current level of 
combat pay set at $225/month.  
Clearly combat pay (IDP/HFP) is woefully deficient in terms of risk compensation, 
but it does recognize service members for duty within combat, close proximity to combat, 
or within an area subject to the threat of imminent danger. However, by attempting to 
ensure that no service member deserving of that recognition misses out on such pay, the 
current policy treats all service members the same, regardless of risk. Those engaged in 
direct combat are given equal amounts of combat pay as someone in a non-combat role and 
with a much lower risk of death. Congress must evaluate the purpose of combat pay and 
determine if it should be based on risk, and if so, establish a combat pay policy that 
accounts for risk differentials. Short of congressional action, the Department of Defense 
has the discretion to adjust the eligibility criteria and increase HFP to $450. Such a revision 
would immediately improve the disparities between occupational risk and combat pay.  
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